Just Membership in a Global Community by Benhabib, Seyla
Macalester Civic Forum
Volume 1
Issue 1 Spring 2007 Article 11
5-4-2009
Just Membership in a Global Community
Seyla Benhabib
Yale University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Macalester Civic Forum by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benhabib, Seyla (2007) "Just Membership in a Global Community," Macalester Civic Forum: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf/vol1/iss1/11
Just Membership 
in a Global Community
Seyla Benhabib
At the dawn of a new century the transnational movement of peo-
ples has emerged as a major political issue of our times. Whether initi-
ated by economic migrants from the poorer regions of the world trying 
to reach the shores of resource-rich democracies in the North and the 
West, or undertaken by asylum and refuge seekers escaping persecu-
tion, civil wars, and natural disasters, or caused by “displaced per-
sons” fleeing ethnic conflict and state-inflicted violence in their own 
societies, such movements have presented the worldwide state system 
with unprecedented challenges.
Here are some numbers. It is estimated that whereas in 1910 roughly 
33 million individuals lived as migrants in countries other than their 
own, by the year 2000 that number had reached 175 million. Strikingly, 
more than half of the increase of migrants from 1910 to 2000 occurred 
in the last three decades of the twentieth century, between 1965 and 
2000. In this period, 75 million people undertook cross-border move-
ments to settle in countries other than that of their origin.1
While migratory movements in the latter half of the twentieth 
century accelerated, the plight of refugees has also grown. There are 
almost 20 million refugees, asylum seekers, and “internally displaced 
persons” in the world. The resource-rich countries of Europe and the 
Northern Hemisphere face growing numbers of migrants, but it is 
mostly nations in the Southern Hemisphere, such as Chad, Pakistan, 
and Ingushetia, that are home to hundreds of thousands of refugees 
fleeing wars in the neighboring countries of the Central African Repub-
lic, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.
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Since September 11, 2001, the discourse on immigration has also 
been increasingly criminalized. Non-members seeking entrance into 
countries other than their own, for any of the above-named reasons, are 
increasingly considered as “threats” and potential “criminals.” This is 
most strikingly reflected in the fact that the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service of one of the oldest immigrant countries of the world, 
namely the U.S.A., has now become incorporated into the Department 
of (so-called) Homeland Security.
Given the salience of these developments, it is surprising that the 
cross-border movements of peoples, and the philosophical as well as 
policy problems suggested by them, have been the object of such scant 
attention in contemporary political thought.2 In my recent book, The 
Rights of Others,3 I intended to fill this lacuna by focusing on politi-
cal membership. By this term I meant the “principles and practices for 
incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refu-
gees and asylum seekers into existing polities.” The principal category 
through which membership has been regulated in the modern world, 
namely national citizenship, has been disaggregated or unbundled into 
diverse elements, and state sovereignty has been frayed. Consequently, 
“We are like travelers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of 
old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. 
While the terrain we are traveling on, the world society of states, has 
changed, our normative map has not.”4
From a philosophical point of view, transnational migrations bring 
to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies 
between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and 
adherence to universal human rights principles, on the other. There is 
not only a tension but often an outright contradiction between human 
rights declarations and the sovereign claims of states to control their 
borders as well as to monitor the “quality” and quantity of those admit-
ted. There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas posed by these dual 
commitments. As the institution of citizenship is disaggregated and 
state sovereignty comes under increasing stress, sub-national as well 
as supra-national spaces for democratic attachments and agency are 
emerging in the contemporary world, and they need to be advanced 
with, rather than in lieu of, existing polities.
In this essay, I begin by exploring the origins of the institution of cit-
izenship, then consider the “disaggregation” of citizenship within the 
European Union and in some other countries of the world, and finally 
I return to recent developments within the United States concerning 
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immigration and conclude with philosophical reflections upon “just 
membership.”
I. Citizenship in Western Political Thought
The concept of citizenship is one of the cornerstones of Western politi-
cal thought. In Greek thought the terms polis, politeia, politike, and poli-
tikon are all derived from the same root. Their Latin cognate is civitas, 
from which is derived “citoyenne” in French and “citizen” in English. 
In German, we encounter the term burgh, meaning fortress or town, 
and the derivation of burgher, as in Staatsburger,5 the German term for 
citizen. In Turkish the word for citizen, Vatandas, derives from the term 
Vatan (which may be Arabic in origin) and which means “homeland.”
This brief etymology serves to remind us that citizenship means first 
and foremost membership in a bounded community. What such mem-
bership entails is itself dependent upon the nature of the political com-
munity. As Aristotle noted, a citizen in a democracy is not the same as 
a citizen in an aristocracy: in a democracy all can vote, without qualifi-
cations of descent and property, while in an aristocracy only some can.6 
Throughout the history of the West, citizenship has excluded certain 
groups of individuals, whether they be women, non-propertied and 
laboring males, or non-Christian and non-white peoples. These human 
beings have been barred from citizenship on the grounds that they did 
not possess the necessary attributes for citizenship, which were often 
understood in conventional terms such as lack of property or income. 
More often, though, they were regarded in much more essentializing 
terms as lacking the requisite capacities of intellect and emotion.7
With the advent of political modernity through the American and 
French Revolutions, citizenship was extended to ever larger numbers 
of human beings. It was also enriched through the growth of rights 
and entitlements that accrued to this status.8
Modern citizenship still means membership in a bounded politi-
cal community, which can be a nation-state, a multinational state, or a 
commonwealth structure. The political regime of territorially bounded 
sovereignty, exercised through formal-rational administrative proce-
dures and dependent upon the democratic will of a more or less cul-
turally homogeneous group of people, can only function by defining, 
circumscribing, and controlling citizenship. Ideal-typically, the citizen 
is the individual who has membership rights to reside within a terri-
tory, who is subject to the state’s administrative jurisdiction, and who 
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is also, at least in principle, a member of the democratic sovereignty in 
whose name laws are issued and administration is exercised. Follow-
ing Max Weber, we may say that this unity of residency, administrative 
subjection, political participation, and cultural membership constitutes the 
“ideal typical” model of citizenship in the modern nation-state of the 
West.9 The influence of this model, whether or not it adequately corre-
sponds to local conditions, extends far beyond the West. Modernizing 
nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, which entered the process 
of state formation at later points than their West European counter-
parts, copied this structure when they came into existence as well.
What is the status of citizenship today, in a world of increasingly 
deterritorialized politics? How is citizenship being reconfigured under 
contemporary conditions? How have globalization and the weakening 
of the functions of the state in controlling and protecting its economy, 
culture, and boundaries against the forces of globalization affected the 
theory and practice of citizenship? How has globalization contributed 
to the reconfiguration of multiculturalism? Which are the most salient 
conflicts around cultural identities in today’s world?
II. Globalization and New Forms of Political Conflict
Recalling Vaclav Havel’s words may give us some insights into these 
questions. In a graduation address to Harvard undergraduates more 
than a decade ago, Havel said, “This civilization is immensely fresh, 
young, new and fragile… . In essence, this new, single epidermis of 
world civilization merely covers or conceals the immense variety of 
cultures, of peoples, of religious worlds, of historical traditions and 
historically formed attitudes, all of which in a sense lie ‘beneath’ it.” 
The spread of globalization is accompanied by new forms of resistance 
and struggle, along with demands for “the right to worship…ancient 
Gods and obey ancient divine injunctions.” The new global civilization 
has to understand itself “as a multicultural and multipolar one.”10
As Havel notes, our contemporary condition is marked by the emer-
gence of new forms of identity politics around the globe. Such identity 
politics, driven by the attachments of nationality, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, “race,” and language, are particularly widespread in the fol-
lowing domains: (1) At the thresholds and borders of new nation-
states, which have emerged out of the disintegration of communist 
regimes in the territories of the older Soviet Union and Eastern and 
Central Europe; (2) In Africa, where the nation-state, a fragile insti-
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tution with roots barely half a century old, is crumbling in Rwanda, 
Uganda, the Congo, and the Ivory Coast; (3) In the Middle East, where 
as a result of the Gulf and Iraq Wars and the continuing Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict, nation-state boundaries, which were haphazardly drawn 
by the occupying powers at the end of the First World War after the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire, seem more problematic than ever; (4) In 
failed states such as Afghanistan, where prior to U.S. intervention, an 
armed group such as the Taliban could take state power, while leaving 
some areas of the country to the authority of warlords; (5) Compared 
to these kinds of identity politics which emerged through institutional 
failures affecting states’ capacities, the most prevalent form of identity 
politics in Western democracies since the late 1960s has been struggles 
for multicultural inclusion, and in some cases, for the multicultural 
diversification of citizenship concepts.
The worldwide women’s and Gay and Lesbian movements, the 
Quebecois aspirations in Canada, the Basque separatist movement in 
Spain, and the ethnic pride movements in the U.S.A. are some of the 
best known “struggles for recognition,” to use Charles Taylor’s famous 
term.11 Reflecting a social dynamic that we have hardly begun to com-
prehend, globalization has thus proceeded alongside socio-cultural 
disintegration, the resurgence of various separatisms, and interna-
tional terrorism.
The impact of these developments upon the institution of citizen-
ship has been “the disaggregation of citizenship.” Ideally, citizenship 
had bundled together residency, administrative subjection, democratic par-
ticipation, and cultural membership. What we are seeing today is that 
the unity of residency, administrative subjection, cultural identity, and 
democratic participation—in short, the modernist and unitary con-
ception of citizenship—is being deeply challenged. Nationality and 
residency status are uncoupled, in that increasing numbers of indi-
viduals reside in countries where they are not nationals. Furthermore, 
residency is accompanied by entitlement to extensive social rights; in 
some cases, even political participation rights are granted on the basis 
of residency and not citizenship.
These developments have taken place against the background 
created by the rise of an international human rights regime. By an 
“international human rights regime,” I mean a set of interrelated and 
overlapping global and regional regimes that encompass human rights 
treaties as well as customary international law or international soft 
law.12 Such examples would include the U.N. treaty bodies under the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention 
of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
The establishment of the European Union (EU) has been accompa-
nied by a Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the formation of a 
European Court of Justice. The European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which also encom-
passes states that are not EU members, permits the claims of citizens 
of adhering states to be heard by a European Court of Human Rights. 
Parallel developments can be seen on the American continent through 
the establishment of the Inter-American System for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
While these treaties are binding on signatory states alone, they have 
set into motion certain developments within global civil society. In the 
words of Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International law today is undergo-
ing profound changes that will make it far more effective than it has 
been in the past. By definition international law is a body of rules that 
regulates relations among states, not individuals. Yet over the course 
of the 21st century, it will increasingly confer rights and responsibili-
ties directly on individuals.”13
Against this general background let me analyze the disaggregation 
of citizenship effect more closely.
III. Disaggregation of Citizenship: The Case of the European Union
The view that citizenship is a status that confers entitlements (that is, 
benefits as well as obligations) derives from T.H. Marshall.14 Marshall’s 
catalogue of civil, political, and social rights is based upon the cumula-
tive logic of struggles for expanding democracy in the 19th and early 
part of the 20th centuries. “Civil rights” arise with the birth of the 
absolutist state, and in their earliest and most basic form they entail 
the rights to the protection of life, liberty, and property; the right to 
freedom of conscience; and certain associational rights, like those of 
commerce and marriage.
“Political rights” in the narrow sense refer to the rights of self-deter-
mination, to hold and run for office, and to establish political and non-
Civic Forum 2007
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political associations, including a free press and free institutions of 
science and culture.
“Social rights” are last in Marshall’s catalogue. They were achieved 
historically through the struggles of workers, women, and other social 
movements of the last two centuries. Social rights entail the right to 
form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, 
health care rights, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, 
childcare, housing, and educational subsidies. These social rights vary 
widely across countries and depend on the social class compromises 
prevalent in any given welfare-state democracy. Their inclusion in any 
internationally agreed upon catalogue of universal human rights—
beyond the mere right to employment and a decent standard of liv-
ing—is a bone of contention among different countries with varying 
economic outlooks.
The disaggregation effect is most advanced in today’s world in the 
contemporary European Union, in which the rights of citizens of the 25 
member countries are sharply delineated from those of third-country 
nationals, within a patchwork of local, national, and supranational 
rights regimes. These so-called “third-country nationals” include 
about three million Turks, scattered across Germany, the Netherlands, 
France, Sweden, Denmark and the U.K.; close to two million members 
from the federation of former Yugoslav states living throughout EU 
countries; about 820,000 Algerians; 516,000 Moroccans; 200,000 Tuni-
sians, mainly in France; and 689,000 migrants from India, 547,000 from 
the West Indies, and 406,000 from Pakistan, mainly in the U.K., some of 
whom have Commonwealth citizenship.
According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003, 
which was not ratified by member states, and was rejected through 
Dutch and French referenda in 2005) and following upon the earlier 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992), “Every national of a Member State shall 
be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to national citizenship and shall not replace it.”15 Nationals of all 25 
countries who are members of the European Union (the U.K., France, 
Germany, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, Poland, Hun-
gary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Lat-
via, Malta, and Cyprus) are also citizens of the European Union. What 
does being a citizen of the Union mean? What privileges and respon-
sibilities, what rights and duties does this entitle? Is citizenship in the 
Union merely a status category, as was membership in the Roman 
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Empire?16 Does membership in the EU amount to more than possess-
ing a passport that allows one to pass through the right doors at border 
crossings?17
Clearly, Union membership is intended to be more than that. Not 
just a passive status, it is expected to involve an active civic identity. 
Citizens of EU states can settle anywhere in the Union, take jobs in 
their chosen countries, and vote as well as stand for office in local 
elections and in elections for the Parliament of Europe. They have the 
right to enjoy consular and diplomatic representation in the territory 
of a third country in which the member state whose nationals they are 
may not be represented. They have the right to petition the European 
Parliament and to apply to the European Ombudsman.18 As Euro-
pean monetary and economic integration progresses, EU members are 
debating whether Union citizenship should entail an equivalent pack-
age of social rights and benefits, such as unemployment compensation, 
health care, and old age pensions, which members of EU states can 
enjoy in whichever EU country they take up residency.
The unitary model of citizenship that combined continuous resi-
dency in a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoy-
ment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative 
jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but not 
another. One can have political rights, such as local and EU level par-
ticipation and voting rights, without being a national, as is the case 
for EU citizens. More commonly, though, as a “guest worker” one has 
social rights and benefits without either sharing in the same collective 
identity or having the privileges of political membership. But this lat-
ter claim also needs modification. In countries such as the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden, “third-country nationals” are also granted 
some political participation and voting rights. In the U.K., Common-
wealth members can vote in local elections.
A two-tiered status of foreignness has evolved: on the one hand, 
there are third-country national foreign residents of European coun-
tries, some of whom were born and raised in these countries and know 
no other homeland; on the other hand are those who may be almost 
total strangers to the language, customs, and history of their host coun-
try but who enjoy special status and privileges in virtue of being a 
national of an EU member state.19
The obverse side of membership in the EU is a sharper delineation 
of the conditions of those who are nonmembers. The agreements of 
Schengen and Dublin were intended to make the practices of granting 
Civic Forum 2007
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asylum and refugee status more uniform throughout member states.20 
Referred to as “legal harmonization” in the early 1990s, these agree-
ments had the paradoxical effect of making such status in the Union 
increasingly difficult.21 Although the European Council of Ministers 
reiterates its adherence to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers and its Protocol of 1967, the EU seeks enhanced 
cooperation with sender countries in controlling the readmission and 
return of their nationals who reach EU territory illegally. Cooperative 
efforts with sender lands to enhance border controls, intercept ille-
gal immigrants, and create asylum systems have increased. Since in 
many cases individuals seeking asylum and refuge are escaping the 
oppressive, illegal, and even murderous regimes of their own coun-
tries, enhanced cooperation with these governments can only have 
disastrous effects upon their lives. A very serious danger posed by 
these developments is the undermining of the individual rights-based 
system of the Geneva Convention and of the moral as well as consti-
tutional obligations of individual states toward refugees and asylum 
seekers, which were based on their own past histories of collaboration 
or resistance to fascism and totalitarianism.22
IV. Citizenship in Non-European Contexts
Can this “disaggregation of citizenship” model be generalized across 
regions and countries? Despite being the largest immigrant nation 
in the world, the American conception of citizenship has remained 
remarkably unitary at the level of granting political rights, by mak-
ing “naturalization” a precondition for political voice. Unlike in some 
countries of the EU, there are no voting rights for legal residents within 
the U.S.A. at either the local or the statewide levels. This practice is 
usually defended by the argument that since the granting of citizen-
ship to legal migrants is fairly open, transparent, and speedy, it is not 
unfair to make the acquisition of citizenship a precondition for politi-
cal voice.23
This argument, however, does not attend to the facts on the ground. 
There are at present an estimated twelve million, in official language, 
“illegal migrants” in the U.S. I prefer to call them “undocumented 
migrants.” Many of these individuals are active and contributing 
members of society. Many serve in the national labor force, work-
ing on farms and in hospitals, hotels, and sanitation services. Others 
send their children to school and are active on community and school 
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boards. These individuals, who service hospitals as nurses or orderlies, 
are themselves scared to become sick and dependent on hospital facili-
ties. Not having one’s papers in order in our society is a form of civil 
death. The status of an illegal migrant is one denuded of political voice 
and the protection of civil laws.
More poignantly, on April 4, 2003, U.S. newspapers reported the 
case of Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez, aged 27, who died in a tank 
battle outside Umm Qasr in Iraq on March 21, 2003. Corporal Gutier-
rez was an illegal immigrant from Guatemala, an orphan who had 
reached the United States through clandestine means and who joined 
the Marines in California. His case is by no means unusual: over a 
dozen legal and illegal immigrants, mainly from Mexico and Central 
America, who were members of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in 
Iraq, have lost their lives since March 2003. It is estimated that about 
37,000 immigrants serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, making up about 
3% of the population on active duty. Their sad stories compelled both 
conservative and liberal lawmakers to hastily pass bills granting these 
slain soldiers, and in some cases their spouses and children, post-
humous citizenship. Others suggested that immigrants who join the 
Armed Forces be granted citizenship immediately, while still others 
advocated the reduction of the current waiting period for the granting 
of citizenship to those in the military from three to two years.
This is by no means the first time that immigrants have served in 
the U.S. army. With the abolition of universal conscription, however, 
joining the army has become a venue for upward mobility for large 
numbers of low-income legal and illegal migrants. We thus have the 
disturbing case of individuals dying for a country that denies them 
voting rights if they are legal permanent residents waiting to become 
“naturalized”; and if they are illegal migrants, as was the case with 
Corporal Guttierez, they do not even have the right to obtain a license 
or open a bank account.
The causes of migrant “illegality” can vary from bureaucratic mis-
haps and mistakes to desperate attempts to escape home countries via 
smugglers, known as “coyotes,” because of circumstances there. The 
status of illegality should not stamp the other as an alien. Clearly, a 
democratic adjustment of the practices of legal incorporation is needed 
in order to normalize the status of illegal immigrants.
While illegal migrant status means civil death and political silenc-
ing, the lack of a political voice for legal permanent residents means 
their effective disenfranchisement. An increasing number of individu-
10
Macalester Civic Forum, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf/vol1/iss1/11
Seyla Benhabib
55
als wish to retain dual citizenship or to live in one country on a long-
term basis while not abdicating their original nationality. Making the 
exercise of democratic voice dependent upon one’s nationality status 
alone, as the United States laws do, flies in the face of the complex 
interdependence of the lives of peoples across borders and territories.
The immigration bill that failed to pass the Senate in spring 2007 
(S. 1348), “A bill to provide for comprehensive immigration reform 
and for other purposes,” was a double-edged sword. While it prom-
ised amnesty to millions of undocumented workers, the attainment of 
which entailed a number of onerous logistical and financial loopholes, 
it also changed the meaning of immigration in ways that have not been 
noted. President Bush’s proposal for a guest worker program obliges 
these individuals to leave the U.S. after their contracts are up, without 
the possibility of ever acquiring permanent residency or, eventually, 
citizenship status. This bill proposes to make into U.S. law the creation 
of a permanent global underclass that services the U.S. economy but 
can never have access to the benefits of a democratic voice and U.S. 
citizenship. This is a radical reversal of the self-understanding of this 
country as a “nation of immigrants,” and this shift in policy reflects the 
paranoid politics of the post-9/11 world in which the “foreigner” and 
the “immigrant” are not viewed as a potential partners with whom 
we must share a moral and political space, but as “threats,” as “enemy 
aliens.” (Given the heated race for the 2008 Presidential elections in the 
U.S.A., this bill has now been tabled till some indefinite date, and cer-
tainly till after the elections.)
While the United States has remained impervious to many calls to 
facilitate dual citizenship and is making it increasingly difficult for 
guest workers to attain American citizenship, countries like Mexico 
and the Dominican Republic permit their large diasporic populations 
to retain certain citizenship rights at home, such as voting in local and 
national elections, continuing to own property, and, in the cases of 
the Dominican Republic and Colombia, even running for and holding 
office. Increasing numbers of Israeli citizens also hold dual citizenship, 
either with the U.S.A. or with other countries of origin. Throughout 
Southeast Asia, India, and Latin America, “flexible citizenship,” which 
permits the disaggregation of aspects of citizenship by giving indi-
viduals multiple residency, property, and political participation rights, 
is emerging as the norm.24
Nevertheless, there is a paradox that affects most of these develop-
ments and which is inherent in the logic of modern statehood and 
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citizenship. It is captured by Hannah Arendt with the phrase “the right 
to have rights.”
V. Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of The Right to Have Rights
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt wrote:
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are 
rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to a community into which 
one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer 
a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation where, unless he 
commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he 
does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of 
people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to 
freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they 
please, but of the right to opinion… . We become aware of the existence of a 
right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged 
by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized 
community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not 
regain these rights because of the new global political situation.25
The first use of the term right in the phrase “the right to have rights” 
does not show the same discursive structure as its second use. In the 
first mention, the identity of the other(s) to whom the claim to be recog-
nized as a rights-bearing person is addressed remains open and inde-
terminate.26 Note that for Arendt such recognition is first and foremost 
a recognition of “membership,” the recognition that one “belongs” to 
some organized human community. One’s status as a rights-bearing 
person is contingent upon the recognition of one’s membership. Who 
is to give or withhold such recognition? Who are the addressees of 
the claim that one “should be acknowledged as a member?” Arendt’s 
answer is clear: humanity itself. And yet she adds, “It is not clear that 
this is possible.”27 The asymmetry between the first and second uses 
of the term right derives from the absence in the first case of a spe-
cific juridico-civil community of consociates who stand in a relation 
of reciprocal duty to one another. What would this duty be?: the duty 
to recognize one as a member, as one who is protected by the legal-
political authorities and treated as a person entitled to the enjoyment 
of rights.
In Arendt’s view, the right to have rights transcends the contingen-
cies of birth, which differentiate and divide us from one another. The 
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right to have rights can only be realized in a political community in 
which we are not judged by the characteristics that define us at birth, 
but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and say and 
think. “Our political life,” writes Arendt, “rests on the assumption 
that we can produce equality through organization, because man can 
act and change and build a common world, together with his equals 
and only with his equals…We are not born equal; we become equal as 
members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee our-
selves mutually equal rights.”28
To sharpen the issue, Arendt was just as skeptical about the ideals 
of world government as she was about the possibility of nation-state 
systems ever to achieve justice and equality for all. World government 
would destroy the space for politics by not allowing individuals to 
define shared public spaces in common. The nation-state system, on 
the other hand, always carries within itself the seeds of exclusionary 
injustice at home and aggression abroad.
While Arendt offers us only paradoxes, albeit fruitful ones that 
show new paths to thinking, we are by no means at a point where we 
have resolved them. But the sharp contrasts which she drew between 
human rights and citizens’ rights have been mitigated through the 
evolution of cosmopolitan norms and the disaggregation of citizen-
ship. National membership is no longer the sole guarantor of access 
to rights and entitlements. Increasingly, the world legal community is 
recognizing a human right to membership, which means the obligation 
of states to naturalize long-term residents and not to denationalize or 
deny citizenship to others.29
Just membership in the new global civil society entails recognizing 
the moral claim of refugees and asylum seekers to first admittance; a 
regime of porous borders for immigrants; an injunction against dena-
tionalization and the loss of citizenship rights; and the vindication of 
the right of every human being “to have rights,” that is, to be a legal 
person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status 
of their political membership. The status of alien ought not to denude 
one of fundamental rights. Furthermore, just membership also means 
the right to citizenship on the part of the alien who has fulfilled certain 
conditions. Permanent alienage is not only incompatible with a liberal 
democratic understanding of human community, it is also a viola-
tion of fundamental human rights. The right to political membership 
must be accommodated by practices that are non-discriminatory in 
scope, transparent in formulation and execution, and justiciable when 
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violated by states and other state-like organs. The doctrine of state 
sovereignty, which has so far shielded naturalization, citizenship, and 
denationalization decisions from scrutiny by international as well as 
constitutional courts, must be challenged. •
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